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  9 
     
   
 Nicole Asquith 
 It is in the comparative analysis of free speech doctrine and the regulation 
of vilification that the vast differences in governmentality and jurisprudence 
of Western nations are most stark. While the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution plays a part in the free speech doctrine of all Western nations, 
it is the United States, alone, that has a constitutional proscription against 
abridging  all speech. Unlike the United States, Canada, South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia all weigh the damage of “words that wound” 
(Matsuda, 1993) against the possible damage to democracy and individual 
freedom arising out the marginalization of its citizens, or, equally, the dam-
age of speech regulation. However, even in the United States, some speech 
is protected. Speech that facilitates economic and status relationships con-
tinues to be abridged (such as insider trading, defamation, libel, union elec-
tions, and product advertising). The Supreme Court has also consistently 
ruled against the free speech of gay men and lesbians. 1 And, more recently, 
so, too, the speech of perceived terrorists has been curtailed. These special 
classes of speech are regulated with the understanding that the protection 
 of capitalism and the protection  against homosexuality and terrorism war-
rant special intervention from the state. In this chapter, I ask why it is that 
these speech acts are perceived to be—and are constructed as—more dam-
aging to democracy than that of vilification against marginalized citizens 
of Western nations. Of all the nations mentioned previously, Australia, as 
with the United States, also stands alone, however, in a very different way 
to the United States. Unlike other Western nations, Australian citizens do 
not have a legislative or constitutional commitment to free speech. Quite the 
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opposite. With the exception of a very limited implied right to freedom of 
political communication—which has been constructed in constitutional law 
as primarily relating to the organization and operation of elections ( Austra-
lian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. the Commonwealth , 1992)—speech and text in 
Australia are regulated not only to manage the economy and terrorism, but 
more important for this chapter, the harms caused to democratic participa-
tion by racial, ethnoreligious, and sexuality vilification. 
 Traditional Millian theory posits that free speech is the most important 
mechanism to achieve a greater tolerance of difference and thus create a dy-
namic marketplace for truth to flourish. 2 In responding to maledictive hate, 3 
theorists such as Gelber (2002) and Butler (1997) have recommended that 
marginalized speech actors engage with a process of speaking back, of re-
turning the gaze to make perpetrators’ contributions to the marketplace of 
ideas marginal and aberrant. However, as will be demonstrated by an analy-
sis of maledictive force and effects, the ideal speech situations of communica-
tive action theory, and the recasting of terms of abuse by “speaking back,” 
require both rational speech actors—something clearly absent in many acts 
of maledictive hate—and an institutional validation of the authenticity of 
marginalized subjects and their speech. Constructing new truths in the mar-
ketplace of ideas is both socially and politically contingent. As such, the ca-
pacity for marginalized subjects to contribute to the marketplace rests on 
their ability to be able to speak with authority and to be authorized to speak. 
Yet, validation as authorized speech actors can be withheld from marginal-
ized groups such that, even when individuals feel empowered to speak back 
to their victimizers, their speech and writing may be forestalled, gagged, 
frustrated, and disabled by the social and historical context of their outsid-
erhood. Furthermore, speaking back is offered by those who oppose the 
regulation of speech as inherently noninstitutional: as an act of individual 
agency. This failure to read institutional responses as a process of speaking 
back—which recontextualizes social relationships, as they exist at the time 
of enactment—fundamentally devalues the contributions that the state, and 
law, can make in managing maledictive hate when it is embodied in dynamic 
constitutional law, government policy, and equitable social interactions. 
 Malediction is critical to the effectiveness of most hate violence. In previ-
ous research, maledictive hate was found to occur in 80 percent of all reported 
cases of antisemitic and heterosexist violence. 4 Explicit, personalized abuse 
constitutes one of the identifying characteristics of hate violence and estab-
lishes it as a practice unique to this form of interpersonal violence. Male-
dictive hate acts as a warning and as a justification: a prelude of things to 
come, and—if addressees respond—a justification for the transformation of 
malediction into physical and sexual violence. Too often in accounts of hate 
violence, escalation from malediction to physical or sexual assault occurs 
when those named in hate violence respond to their victimizer’s heed and 
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take on the label spat out in hate. Embracing outsiderhood is proof enough 
that disorder is contained  in the marginal body and that order must be rein-
stated by physical containment  of the body. 
 Rather than employing a simplistic Millian or equally unresponsive post-
structuralist theoretical framework to account for this transformation from 
speech to action, Bourdieu’s critical engagement with Austinian speech act 
theory (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991) and Langton’s (1993) twist on speech 
act theory have been foregrounded in this chapter. Employing such frame-
works does not mean that I privilege state intervention over a radical rework-
ing of social institutions and social interactions—for that would fall prey to 
the misrecognition of state power as arbitrary. However, it will also be shown 
that “speaking back” from unauthorized or deauthorized social positions is 
as ineffective as state intervention that is purely symbolic or overly zealous; 
both are incapable of bringing about real change to the lived experiences of 
survivors of heterosexist, anti-Muslim, and antisemitic hate violence. 
 PERFORMATIVE “SPEECH” ACTS 
 In 1955, Austin (1980) presented a series of lectures titled  How to Do 
Things with Words. This work reconstructed the field of linguistic philoso-
phy at that time and, later, reconstructed the debate over the regulation of 
pornography and “hate speech” in the United States. In an attempt to short-
circuit the limitations imposed by the First Amendment on the regulation 
of “content,” MacKinnon (1997) and critical race theorists (Matsuda, 1993) 
have recontextualized the maledictive hate of pornography and “hate speech” 
as conduct, rather than mere words. Central to this conversion from maledic-
tion to conduct was the redeployment of Austin’s (1980) analysis of perlocu-
tionary and illocutionary performative speech acts. In  How to Do Things with 
Words, he argues that 
 we first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which 
together we summed up by saying we perform a  locutionary act, which is 
roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and 
reference. . . . Second, we said that we also perform  illocutionary acts such 
as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, &c., i.e., utterances which 
have a certain (conventional) force. Thirdly, we may also perform  perlocu-
tionary acts: what we bring about or achieve  by saying something, such as 
convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading. 
(p. 109) 
 From this seemingly simple classification of speech and the ways in which 
speech can be action, theorists such as Bourdieu, Butler, and Langton have 
developed a sophisticated system for assessing the force and effects of subor-
dinating and silencing malediction. However, particularly for Bourdieu and 
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Langton, it is Austin’s deeper analysis of the forms of  illocutionary speech that 
provides the basis for their claims about the authority to speak and the power 
of authorized speech. Austin, in his analysis of performative acts, details five 
classes of illocutionary utterances (Austin, 1980), two of which Langton has 
reclassified as  authoritative illocutions: verdictives (exercise of judgment) and 
exercitives (exercising of power; Langton, 1993). 
 The first of these classes of illocutions relates to the “delivering of a find-
ing, official or  unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact” (Austin, 
1980, p. 153, emphasis added). Verdictive illocutions aim to rank and value 
the addressee and thus establish a verdict on the “truth and falsity, soundness 
and unsoundness and fairness and unfairness” (Austin, 1980, p. 153) of their 
subjectivity or contributions to the marketplace of ideas. In maledictive hate, 
verdictive illocutions include naming and pathologizing individuals within a 
hierarchy of social positions according to their proximity to dominant rep-
resentations of the body and identity. The second class of illocutions are ex-
ercitive performatives, and unlike verdictive illocutions, they are a judgment 
that it “is to be so, as distinct from a judgment that it is so: it is advocacy that 
it should be so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so; . . . it is an award as 
opposed to an assessment; it is a sentence as opposed to a verdict” (Austin, 
1980, p. 155). More than verdictives, exercitives require an authorized or 
conventional force to bring about the objective of the “speech” act. Further-
more, where verdictives are temporally present or an assessment of the past, 
exercitives are statements about how the future should look: an advocacy of 
things to come. As such, if exercitives are spoken with authority or by an 
authorized delegate, they are capable of influencing addressees in more ways 
than verdictives. 
 HARMS OF HATE: SUBORDINATION 
AND SILENCE 
 Langton argues that authoritative illocutions are capable of achiev-
ing two types of action: subordination and silencing. There is an impor-
tant relationship between subordination and silencing. Many free speech 
theorists suggest that the best way to dismantle explicitly subordinating 
malediction—which ranks individuals and groups, legitimizes inequitable 
treatment toward them, and withdraws rights and privileges from them—
is with more speech (see, e.g., Allen & Jensen, 1995; Butler, 1997; Gates 
et al., 1994; Gelber, 2002; Heyman, 1996). However, as Langton (1993) 
highlights, fighting maledictive hate with more speech is an impossible 
task when marginalized individuals or groups are also silenced. She argues 
that “free speech is a good thing because it  enables people to act. . . . Speech 
that silences is bad, not just because it restricts the ideas available on the 
shelves, but because it constrains people’s action” (p. 328). However, when 
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gay men, lesbians, Muslims, and Jews are unable to make recognizable con-
tributions to the marketplace—as authorized participants in discussions 
and as experts on the subject of hate—they are not only silenced, they are 
also subordinated. 
 Addressees are subordinated when maledictive hate “rank[s] certain peo-
ple as inferior . . . legitimate[s] discriminatory behavior towards them . . . 
[and] deprive[s] them of powers and rights” (Langton, 1993, p. 307). Being 
ranked as inferior, and having that assessment legitimated (e.g., through the 
devaluation of violence against gay men or lesbians, or the conflation of Mus-
lim with terrorist), also creates the conditions for withholding rights and 
privileges, such as the banning of same-sex marriage and adoption or guard-
ianship by same-sex couples (as is the case in Australia), or for regulatory 
controls that make religious faith the new racial profile for governmental 
policy, institutional practices, and localized interactions. 5 
 The second set of actions achieved in performative malediction is silenc-
ing. Langton (1993) suggests that if speech (or text) is action, “then silence is 
the failure to act” (p. 314) or the failure of speech to count as an action. This 
failure to act can be seen in the locutionary gag, perlocutionary frustration, 
and illocutionary disablement. While Langton privileges the latter form of 
silencing (illocutionary disablement)—perhaps due to her need to operate 
within the confines of First Amendment jurisprudence—all three forms of 
silencing have sufficient force to harm marginalized subjects. 
 The primary form of silencing is the locutionary gag. This is where speech 
or text is unavailable because the conditions for articulating are made “un-
speakable” (or unwritable). The principal way silence is secured is through 
the loss of mechanical means (such as limited access to a public forum or a 
physical incapacity) to create speech or text. Silence as the result of mechani-
cal loss is a significant factor in any traumatic incident. Traumatic memory, 
unlike automatic memory or narrative memory, resides largely in corporeal 
sensation and dysfunction. Recollecting traumatic memory calls on different 
parts of the brain than those required to speak and construct narratives of 
experiences (Brison, 1999). Brison suggests that this is one reason why many 
survivors of trauma (such as hate violence) lose the ability to articulate a 
coherent narrative of the encounter, and why memories of these events can 
appear as “full of fleeting images, the percussion of blows, sounds, and move-
ments of the body” (Culbertson, as cited in Brison, 1999, p. 42). 
 The second way that Langton (1993) suggests that silence can be secured 
is through perlocutionary frustration. While locutionary silence is the failure 
to make a sound, perlocutionary frustration is achieved by letting a person 
speak but not letting those speech or textual acts have the intended effect. 
Austin (1980) argues that  by saying something—in contrast to the illocution-
ary force created  in saying something—“often, or even normally . . . certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, 
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or of the speaker, or of other persons” are produced (p. 101). These perlo-
cutionary effects may be that the audience is persuaded, or intimidated, or 
convinced by the speaker’s arguments. Perlocutionary silence or frustration 
is a regular part of everyday life such that “one invites, but nobody attends 
the party; one votes, hoping to oust the government, but one is outnumbered” 
(Langton, 1993, p. 315); one refuses consent in sex, and it is ignored. How-
ever, for marginalized subjects, perlocutionary frustration is more likely to be 
integral to their life experiences because their marginality results in the con-
struction of their identity as flawed, suspect, and inadmissible (e.g., the “don’t 
ask, don’t tell” policy of the U.S. military). For a perlocutionary statement to 
be successful, it must be articulated by a social actor recognized as a “speaker” 
with authority. If marginalized subjects are proscribed from positions of au-
thority (even on the subject of marginality), then the effects of their speech 
and writing are bound to be frustrated. 
 The final form of silence is presented by Langton as the most serious way 
that the objectives of marginalized subjects are disabled. An illocutionary 
malediction is one that does something  in the saying or writing. Illocution-
ary disablement occurs when “when one speaks, one utters words, and fails 
not simply to achieve the effect one aims at, but fails to perform the very 
action one intends”: one refuses to accept hate speech, and it is transformed 
into “fighting words”; one refuses consent in sex, and it is transformed into 
an eroticized “yes” (Langton, 1993, p. 321). In illocutionary performatives, 
not only are addressors required to speak with authority (or, at least, with 
a veneer of expertise), but they are also required to be authorized to speak. 
Consequently, those with no recognized authority or expertise, or those who 
are not delegated to speak on a given topic, can have their speech, text, and 
actions disabled. 
 SPEAKING WITH AUTHORITY AND 
THE AUTHORITY TO SPEAK 
 When Judith Butler (1997) turned to Austin’s work four years after Lang-
ton’s analysis of sexual violence, it was to interrogate the use of perlocution-
ary effect and illocutionary force as a theoretical and legal tool in regulating 
subordinating and silencing maledictive hate. Butler rejects a straightforward 
reading of illocutionary force and the idea of a state-sponsored response to 
maledictive hate. She advocates an appropriation of maledictive hate, which 
creates new contexts of meaning and thus deauthorizes, then reauthorizes, the 
words or text. In the space between meaning and intent—between speaking 
and acting—Butler (1997) argues that there is a slippery reiterative moment 
where there is an opportunity for a reversal, an appropriation, or an expro-
priation that undermines the hatred and intentions of the speaker or writer 
and offers new meanings, new intentions, and the chance of linguistic agency. 
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 Butler (1997) further argues that illocutionary force is reserved for few 
occasions in contemporary societies as it relies on prior convention to 
convey what is said (the meaning and intent)  and the physical, corporeal 
power to bring about the uttered intent or meaning. She suggests that 
there are moments of illocutionary force but that any analysis of maledic-
tion that claims this rare moment as the primary social process closes or 
fixes the possibilities of changing or uncoupling the hurtful connections 
between meaning and intent and the ability to act on that meaning and 
intent. Butler (1997) contends that every utterance is unstable and open 
to reinterpretation. In fixing the meanings of maledictive hate within a 
state framework such as law, she argues, we undermine the possibility of 
inscribing new meanings and therefore hinder the addressee’s linguistic 
agency. 
 Regulating some hateful speech, for Butler (1997), is a partial task of 
interrogating “words that wound” because contexts and meaning change 
over time and place and because some performatives actually gain their 
force from the break with prior contexts (e.g., “queer” in the mouths of 
gay men and lesbians, or “nigger” in the mouths of African Americans). 
Bourdieu rejects Butler’s (1997) position, claiming instead that social 
power is invested in all speech acts prior to this utterance of “words that 
wound” (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991). They highlight that the conven-
tional means that bring about linguistic success are not embodied in lan-
guage use—nor is convention authorized internally to language; rather, 
convention is effective because of the social conditions external to lan-
guage, that is, the social conditions of those who get to speak, those who 
are allowed to speak (but within limitations), and those who are silenced 
completely. Bourdieu argues that the illocutionary forces of performative 
utterances do not gain their efficacy from “the fact that they seem to pos-
sess in themselves the source of a power”; rather, this efficacy “resides in 
the institutional conditions of their production and reception” (Bourdieu 
& Thompson, 1991, p. 111). This theoretical approach has the advantage 
of foregrounding the social construction of authority and thus the social 
conventions required for individuals to wield hate as an act of power. 
 In this sense, language is a social structure instituted  prior to any utter-
ance by the speaker (or writer), and maledictive hate is a habit that requires 
generational reinscription for it to do its social magic. Intergenerational re-
inscription (whether of hate or respect) requires structural processes—not 
just social interactions—for hate or respect to pass to the next generation. 
In this sense, as Langton (1993) argues, speaking (or writing) with author-
ity requires social recognition of one’s position as a specialist on the subject 
under discussion, while being authorized to speak requires a social delega-
tion of power to define the subject of discussion, and whether the subject is 
in fact a valid, legitimate matter to be discussed at all. 
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 SPEECH ACT THEORY AND ANTI-VILIFICATION 
LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA 
 Given that institutional validation or recognition has been the most potent 
form of social recognition available in Western democratic states, it appears 
counterproductive to suggest that a privatized response is the principal and 
most successful way to eliminate maledictive hate. Although a small number 
of individuals and communities may at times feel empowered to engage with 
perpetrators of hate violence without the intervention of the state, 6 priori-
tizing this form of response not only constructs others unable to act in this 
manner as socially deficient, but it also constructs social change as a localized 
process. Unlike privatized individual or community responses to maledictive 
hate, state intervention can establish the ground rules of social engagement 
for all citizens. This is not to say that marginalized groups have no role in 
the elimination of maledictive hate or that individuals and communities can-
not make significant changes to the experience of hate; rather, it is to argue 
that these groups require state support and intervention for their voices to 
be perceived as being authorized and as having the requisite expertise or 
authority to be contributors to the issues raised by hatred. 
 Without a First Amendment to hamper their intervention, since 1995, 
Australian state and federal governments have adopted a variety of mecha-
nisms to seek remedies for the damages caused by maledictive hate. While 
these laws have been constructed as great symbols of the intent of Aus-
tralian government, unfortunately, this intervention has been largely obvi-
ated. In part, the lack of success of Australian vilification law is due to the 
conditions under which intervention is tolerable to the electorate, but also 
because Australian governments (unlike their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom, South Africa, and Canada) have abrogated their responsibility 
as active participants in this adjudication of maledictive hate in favor of an 
individualized, privatized system of civil law. In particular, anti-vilification 
measures, such as the  New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 7 and 
the Commonwealth of Australia’s  Racial Hatred Act 1995 , 8 seek to regulate 
only complaints of vilification submitted by individuals who are recognized 
members of the victim groups named in the legislation. In practice, this 
means that only a Jew can make a complaint of antisemitic vilification, or 
only gay men and lesbians could make complaints of sexuality vilification. 
Furthermore, under these Acts, a case of vilification can only be met if the 
speech or text incites—or could possibly incite—another person to hate. 
Vilification in Australia is judged not on the basis of the intent of perpetra-
tors; rather, harm is assessed through the eyes of the reasonable third person 
of law. While an objective assessment is preferable to the subjective assess-
ment of intent, the reasonable third person is also problematic. Finally, Aus-
tralian models for regulating maledictive hate, while requiring a public act 
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of hatred, are adjudicated in camera. This effectively hinders the capacity for 
these institutional responses to maledictive hate to create a social commit-
ment to—that is, perlocutionary effects for—the elimination of vilification. 
 The right to demand a life free from targeted violence requires state in-
terventions that establish a set of standards for good citizenship. Law should 
never be solely an exercise in symbolism; it must also be able to change the 
circumstances of hatred. Too often, institutional measures, such as the  Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) and the  Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth), are pre-
sented as symbols of the intent of state and federal governments, rather than 
as mechanisms for real social change. The containment of these legislative 
responses to acts of symbolism stems primarily from the adjudicating frame-
work employed to seek redress for marginalized subjects. In particular, these 
institutional measures only partially capture the acts of hatred experienced 
by marginalized subjects because these civil procedures only relate to public 
speech and textual acts that incite  others to hate. These regulatory measures 
only trap those acts that create effects on others, rather than those that cre-
ate force against the primary addressee. This is the reverse of the regulatory 
system in the United States, which can only ever regulate maledictive hate 
that is constructed as action (such as illocutionary speech acts of “fighting 
words”). In Australian regulatory systems, it is not enough that one person 
hates, that hatred must be able to infect another’s mind. Governments in 
Australia have deemed that the damage of vilification is not contained in the 
initial authoritative  illocution; rather, the damage is contained in the maledic-
tive,  perlocutionary infection of another. This preference for secondary effects 
over primary force significantly devalues the damage done in the one-on-one 
engagement between addressee and addressor. 
 The second major concern in relation to the regulatory frameworks ad-
opted by Australian governments is their use of the objective, reasonable 
third person to assess the harm caused by maledictive hate. To adjudicate 
the secondary effect of malediction, governments have established the  ordi-
nary reasonable person as the third person in every encounter of vilification—
whether or not there is an actual third person present in the encounter. In 
 Harou - Sourdon v. TCN Channel Nine (1994; as cited in McNamara, 2002) the 
Tribunal of the Equal Opportunity Commission set the reasonable person as 
one who is neither “immune from susceptibility to incitement” nor compelled 
to act with “racially prejudiced views.” Given that the objective approach re-
quires an analysis of the social and historical contexts that play a part in each 
incident of vilification, it appears counterintuitive to start from a position of 
the ordinary reasonable person not being inclined to racist or heterosexist 
views. Australia was founded on the racist proclamation of  terra nullius (empty 
land); it did not give indigenous Australians full citizenship until 1967; it 
maintained a white Australia immigration policy until 1967; it criminalized 
sodomy (in Tasmania) until 1998. How, then, can we expect that the ordinary 
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reasonable person is somehow immune from this socialization? Takach (1994) 
suggests that vilification legislation was introduced to remedy a perceived so-
cial problem. However, in the conversion from social policy to a legal frame-
work, the objective approach “may not take into account the viewpoint of the 
very group[s] that the . . . legislation is designed to support” (p. 41). 
 Finally, as both Gelber (2002) and McNamara (2002) argue, civil com-
plaint systems that require  public acts of discrimination, harassment, and 
vilification to be adjudicated primarily through a  private, in camera concili-
ation process fail to achieve either the objective of establishing a symbol of 
the intent of governments or the production of real social change. While 
vilification must be a public act, remedies to vilification are confined largely 
to private conciliation, where neither parties (nor the tribunals hearing the 
matter) are permitted to speak publicly about the proceedings. Gelber (2002) 
argues that confining these acts of vilification to the public sphere, and the 
conciliation of these acts to the private sphere, fundamentally undermines 
the stated goals and objectives of the legislation, as decisions reached are not 
made public and do not serve as symbols of unacceptable behavior. 
 Each of these imperfections in the regulatory frameworks in Australia limit 
the ability for marginalized subjects to seek justice. However, they offer some 
limited remedies to maledictive hate, albeit partial and available in a few privi-
leged cases. Adopting Austin’s performative speech act theory may, however, 
assist in ameliorating some of the more debilitating impediments of Australian 
vilification law. This is not to make a case for textual analysis as the  only tool in 
adjudicating malediction; rather, speech act theory could serve as an additional 
framework to clarify the purpose, intent, and consequences of malediction and, 
as a result, lead to a more effective system that is based on the force  and effect 
of malediction, instead of the assessment of the reasonable third person. 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The primary defense to free speech—that which Gates (1994) argue con-
stitutes “armchair absolutists’ Old Reliable” (p. 23)—is a slippery slope. Over 
the last six years, since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pen-
tagon, many Western nations have lost traction on the free speech slippery 
slope, perhaps with the belief that regulating the speech and text of terrorists 
will forestall similar attacks. Whether this curtailment of speech and writing 
has been successful or not, for some, this regulation is a clear demonstration 
of the slippery problems associated with abridging speech. However, if we 
are to accept that the slope is slippery, then we must also accept, as Gates 
(1994) point out, that 
 a more accurate account of where we currently stand is somewhere half-
way up the side of the mountain; we already are, and always were, on that 
slippery slope. (p. 23) 
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 This view of free speech theory—from the side of the mountain, rather the 
pinnacle—highlights the negotiated nature of speech regulation and the so-
cial effort required to manage speech and text and their force and effects. We 
must also contextualize the slippery slope: where does the slope lead; what 
is its gradient; who and how many are making the trek up its slope; and is 
there a commitment to trekking the slope for time immemorial, even when 
the costs are high and borne disproportionately? 
 The state (in all Western nations) has defined the illocutionary acts of 
terrorists as unspeakable and unwritable because they  may cause harm or 
may represent the beginnings of harm; that is, that the perlocutionary effects 
of  speech, rather than the illocutionary force of speech  acts, are sufficient to 
warrant curtailment. In effect, they are what Iganski (2002) considers  in ter-
rorem. Maledictive hate—especially threats of death—are speech and textual 
acts that  do things in the saying and create a set of consequences for the ad-
dressees. Equally, these acts of malediction are, in effect and force,  in terrorem. 
Yet, while the former set of speech and textual acts is regulated, its comple-
mentary partner in malediction is constructed as ethereal, as somehow less 
harmful than threats of terrorism. 
 It has been suggested throughout this chapter that the simple remedy 
proposed by traditional Millian theory—that maledictive hate can be coun-
tered by additional speech acts in the marketplace of ideas—fails to account 
for the legitimated power of illocutionary force. When viewed through Aus-
tinian speech act theory, Australian anti-vilification laws appear either to 
ignore or devalue the force of authoritative illocutions, preferring instead 
to privilege the perlocutionary effects of malediction. This not only reduces 
anti-vilification legislation to ineffectual, symbolic law, it also indicates to 
those citizens most at risk of social death that their governments are largely 
unconcerned by the violence of their everyday lives, except when it incites 
others to action. It has been suggested that the limited success achieved to 
date through civil anti-vilification complaint procedures can be remedied by 
the employment of a more nuanced interpretation of the textual properties of 
maledictive hate and the illocutionary force of authorized speech. The refor-
mation of institutional measures will ensure that the symbolism is converted 
into an authorized redistribution of justice. 
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 NOTES 
 1. For example,  Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Committee v. Rhode Island 
Bicentennial Foundation (417 F. Supp. 632 U.S. Dist. RI, 1976) , Council on Re-
ligion and the Homosexual v. PT&T (70 Cal. PUC 471, 1969) , Solmitz v. Maine 
School Administrative District (495 A. 2d 812 Sup. Ct. Maine, 1985), and  San 
Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee (483 U.S. 
522, 1987), as cited in Siegel (1995). 
 2. For a full discussion of Millian free speech theory, see Gates (1994), 
Heyman (1996), Allen and Jensen (1995), and Ten (1980). 
 3. In this chapter, I have made a break with traditional analyses of vio-
lence against gay men, lesbians, Muslims, and Jews, particularly in relation to 
the terms used to define “mere words.” In the construction of “hate speech” 
(and, of course, in the deployment of speech act theory), most analyses gloss 
over the fact that these practices include spoken and written forms of hatred. 
To remedy the shortcomings of the term  hate speech, I have resurrected the 
term  malediction —and  maledictive hate —for its verbal and textual properties 
and for its stronger meaning: “the utterance of a curse, the condition of being 
reviled, and an evil intention or deed” (as defined in the  Shorter Oxford En-
glish Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 4. See Asquith (2009). The claims and recommendations made in this chap-
ter are based on a quantitative and textual analysis of 1,227 complaints of an-
tisemitic and heterosexist hate violence, discrimination, and vilification lodged 
with the Lesbian and Gay Anti-Violence Project, the Executive Council of Aus-
tralian Jewry, and the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board between 
January 1995 and December 1999. This initial research has been enhanced by 
the textual analysis of 173 articles relating to the Cronulla riots published in 
Australian newspapers between December 10, 2005, and January 19, 2006. 
 5. As per the  Marriage Act of 1961 (Cth), as amended in 2004 by the Par-
liament of Australia. 
 6. In the analysis of complaints lodged by gay men and lesbians to the 
Lesbian and Gay Anti-Violence Project, only 17 percent of complainants in-
dicated that they felt capable of responding to their perpetrators or of fight-
ing back (Asquith, 2009). 
 7.  Anti-Discrimination Act of 1977 (NSW), Parliament of New South 
Wales, Australia (No. 48 of 1977). 
 8.  Racial Hatred Act of 1995 (Cth), Parliament of Australia (No. 101 of 
1995). 
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